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Foreign exchange policy and intervention in Thailand 
Financial Markets Operations Group 
Bank of Thailand 
I. Introduction 
This paper summarises information on how Thailand conducted its foreign exchange rate policy after 
the float. A special emphasis is given to intervention motives and techniques. It also outlines some 
foreign exchange measures used in deterring speculative flows. 
Since 2 July 1997, Thailand has adopted a managed-float exchange rate regime, replacing the 
basket-peg regime which had been in operation since 1984. The value of the baht has since then 
been largely determined by market forces. The Bank of Thailand manages the exchange rate by 
intervening in the foreign exchange market from time to time in order to prevent excessive volatilities in 
the markets, while fundamental trends are accommodated. In other words, movements in the 
exchange rates which are in line with the changes in economic fundamentals and financial 
development would only be smoothed and not resisted. 
The managed-float exchange rate regime together with the inflation targeting framework, which was 
formally introduced in May 2000 with short-term interest rates as the operating target, has worked well 
for Thailand. The inflation target performs the role of a new nominal anchor for monetary policy while 
flexibility in exchange rates helps absorb shocks to the economy.  
Since the adoption of the managed-float exchange rate regime, the Thai baht has generally moved in 
line with economic fundamentals. However, extreme exchange rate movements have occasionally 
occurred due to various causes. As a result, different combinations of techniques and tactics were 
used depending on the market conditions. Broadly speaking, the Bank of Thailand focuses on 
containing excessive and persistent exchange rate volatility and intervenes when exchange rate 
movements appear to be inconsistent with fundamental changes. Short-term volatility is not a major 
concern unless it persists and becomes a threat to stability. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The next two sections briefly describe recent 
developments in the foreign exchange market and an institutional setup as background information. 
Section IV then explains why the Bank of Thailand intervenes in the foreign exchange market, while 
section V elaborates how foreign exchange policy is carried out. The last section on the information 
disclosure describes our view on transparency issue. 
II.  Developments in the foreign exchange market after the float 
Since the float, exchange rates have generally moved in line with economic fundamentals. Figure 1 
shows how the baht has moved against the US dollar since the float. The baht/US dollar exchange 
rate fluctuated widely from 36-56 baht/US dollar. However, in the past few years, the exchange rate 
has been relatively stable as reflected in the considerably lower volatilities.
1 In effective terms, 
however, the NEER and REER, shown in Figure 2, were relatively stable as most regional currencies 
had generally moved in tandem. 
                                                       
1  Volatility is measured by the annualised standard deviation of daily returns (percentage change in exchange rates). BIS Papers No 24  277
 
Figure 1 


























































































































































































































































































































Offshore financial institutions have long been major players in the Thai foreign exchange market since 
there are no regulations on foreign exchange trading in the spot market. Offshore players have always 
accounted for a significant share of foreign exchange market volume until recently (September 2003), 
when restrictions were imposed on non-resident baht accounts (NRBA) and short-term liquidity 
management following a surge in capital inflows which were deemed speculative in nature. As can be 
seen in Figure 3, non-residents accounted for around half of the average daily trading turnover in all 
foreign exchange transactions (spot + forward + foreign exchange swap) before the baht was floated. 
As foreign exchange regulations were imposed, the proportion of non-resident (NR) trading gradually 
declined. Since September 2003, when measures to deter short-term speculative inflows were put in 278  BIS Papers No 24
 
place, non-residents have been considerably less active in the Thai baht market. Their share has 
fallen to less than 20%. 
Figure 3 
Foreign exchange daily turnover by player group 
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Despite some restrictions on speculative players which has caused reductions in market turnover, the 
foreign exchange market is still thriving. The daily turnover of interbank and customer transactions in 
the spot and forward markets averages around US$ 1 billion, which is quite substantial compared to 
other financial markets. Figure 4 shows that the swap market remains the most active market in terms 
of average daily turnover, but after the September 2003 measure, its share of the market has fallen 
back to the pre-float level. It is worth noting that forward transactions currently make up around 8% of 
total market turnover, compared to 5% in the pre-float period. This is seen as a good sign that Thai 
corporates are more aware of the exchange risk they take and thus hedge accordingly. This implies 
that our intervention does not result in public perception that the central Bank will maintain any 
particular level of the exchange rate. In addition, narrow bid-offer spreads and stable margin levels 
reflect better market conditions in terms of liquidity and efficiency. The market is poised to grow even 
further as new products, especially hedging instruments, are being developed. 
III.  Institutional setup (relationships with government) 
On the policy level, the Government decides on the foreign exchange regime, while the Bank has the 
responsibility to manage the exchange rate under that regime. Also, the Bank manages the official 
foreign exchange reserves. The Bank therefore is responsible for all costs/benefits of intervention and 
other related operations and it is obliged to remit its annual net profits to the government.
2 
                                                       
2  In accordance with The Bank of Thailand Act, BE 2485 and the Currency Act, BE 2501, the bank keeps two separate 
accounts: one for the banking department (the general account) and the other for the issue department (the currency 
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Figure 4 
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Total =  
USD 2,702 mn
Total =  
USD 4,863 mn
 
IV.  Why do we intervene? 
For a small economy that is very open to trade and capital flows like Thailand, movements in 
exchange rates causing changes in the value of the trade-weighted effective exchange rate, both 
nominal and real, can have a significant impact on the economy, particularly on inflation and GDP 
outcomes. 
Moreover, exchange rates can overshoot. In this case, intervention may help in limiting the extent of 
overshooting, thus avoiding the disruptive impact and the need for costly real economic adjustment. 
Besides, it would enable the private sector to gradually adjust to the changing environment more 
efficiently. It is important, therefore, for the Bank to take these into account and intervene if conditions 
warrant. 
As such, the bank largely intervenes to contain excessive volatility of the exchange rates. There are no 
specific target levels for the exchange rate. Intervention is aimed to smooth out and prevent excessive 
and persistent exchange rate volatility and disorderly movements, but not to resist changes in the 
exchange rate which are in line with broader economic fundamentals. If pressure on exchange rates 
reflects fundamental economic forces then it would be accommodated.  
It is worth emphasising here that in implementing foreign exchange policy, the bank’s primary concern 
is large and persistent departures of the exchange rate from its fundamental values, rather than short-
term fluctuations. It is very crucial to identify factors that move the exchange rate from its fundamental 
values. In practice, we employ several indicators to help us distinguish desirable changes in the 
exchange rate from undesirable, excessive and destabilising changes. Specifically, both the bilateral 
rate of the Thai baht against the US dollar and the effective exchange rates are carefully monitored. 
The bank also monitors market activities, strategic positions, bid-ask spreads, composition and 
                                                                                                                                                                       
reserve). The bank is required to remit 75% of its annual net profit in the general account to the government. The other 25% 
of the annual net profit is accumulated in the general account’s “ordinary reserve”. In addition, since 2002, the bank is also 
required to remit 100% of annual net profit from the currency reserve account to the government to pay off the principal on 
the bonds issued in accordance with the emergency decree empowering the Ministry of Finance to borrow and administer 
the borrowing to assist the Financial Institutions Development Fund Stage Two, BE 2545. 280  BIS Papers No 24
 
magnitude of foreign exchange turnover, option-implied volatility and short-term exchange rate 
volatilities, as shorter-term exchange rate fluctuations could be used as an early warning indicator to 
help signal circumstances where there might be misalignment or destabilising market activities.  
Moreover, it is believed that some degree of volatility is healthy and conducive to the development of a 
liquid foreign exchange market. As it is essential to provide a sense of two-way risk to the market, the 
bank has been very careful not to dampen the volatility by too much and interfere with the 
development of the market. This consideration is taken into account when formulating intervention 
strategy so that it provides the right incentives for the market to develop the ability to cope with 
changing circumstances or various shocks and does not undermine risk management systems in the 
private sector. 
For a while, immediately after the 1997 crisis, accumulating foreign exchange reserves was another 
important consideration for exchange rate management. A strong stock of reserves helps to minimise 
external vulnerability and increase confidence in the economy, especially among foreign investors. 
Greater confidence regarding the economy, in turn, promotes a sound and stable currency. Indeed, 
with international reserves amounting to US$ 46 billion at the end of October 2004, Thailand’s external 
position is sound and the baht has been more resilient in the face of external shocks. On the one 
hand, a high level of reserves certainly helps to support a stable currency, but on the other hand, it 
incurs sterilisation costs or costs associated with fluctuations of short-term interest rates. However, it is 
ultimately of secondary importance to exchange rate stability itself. In all this however, it is the 
maintenance of the inflation target that is the overriding objective of monetary policy. 
V.  How do we carry out our foreign exchange policy? 
It is important that our foreign exchange policy and operations are consistent with the inflation targets. 
The inflation targeting framework does bestow a considerable degree of flexibility upon monetary 
policy, allowing the Bank to vary the balance between growth and inflation, as well as internal and 
external balance, so long as inflation is within the target range. The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) 
takes into account movements in exchange rates, among other things, when formulating the policy 
stance, but changes to that stance are signalled and communicated solely through the policy rate: the 
14-day repurchase rate. 
A broad guideline on foreign exchange operations is set by the bank’s market management 
sub-committee. The committee meets on a weekly basis to keep up to date with latest developments 
in the financial markets. Foreign exchange intervention techniques and tactics are formally evaluated 
(by the risk management group
3) and revised quarterly or if necessary. Effectiveness of intervention is 
also studied regularly. 
In carrying out our foreign exchange policy, we monitor the markets and intervene when deemed 
appropriate. Prudential exchange measures and regulations are also put in place to help stabilise the 
market. 
¾  Monitoring exchange rate developments 
To monitor foreign exchange rate movements, the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) and the 
real effective exchange rate (REER) are both used as important pieces of information to make sure 
that our medium and long-term competitiveness, compared to the rest of the world, are in check.  
                                                       
3  The evaluation exercise is conducted approximately every quarter and typically involves a quantitative analysis performed 
by the risk management group to assess on how the FX intervention-related operations/regulations impact subsequent 
exchange rate movements. To do this, a statistical comparison based on hypergeometric distribution is used for testing. A 
significant result implies that the number of effective interventions is significantly different from the number of periods in 
which the market corrects itself, ie periods when the exchange rate naturally changes without any intervention. Based on 
this quantitative analysis, direct intervention of an appropriate size in the spot market has consistently been shown to 
significantly counteract the destabilising/excessive flows in the short term. BIS Papers No 24  281
 
Moreover, certain qualitative indicators are also monitored so as to analyse what causes excessive 
movements or market instability, whether they stem from speculative flows or real trade and 
investment flows. These include, for example, flows of non-resident funds into all financial markets, 
flows of large exporters/importers, liquidity conditions in the offshore swap market, the options market 
and option-implied volatility, market long/short and strategic positions, significant technical or stop-loss 
levels, bid-offer spreads, etc. In addition, through our reporting requirements, we are able to observe 
volume, aggregate order flow in the markets, and other relevant foreign exchange positions of financial 
intermediaries. 
¾  Intervention 
The Bank employs both verbal intervention and actual intervention. The Bank intervenes in the foreign 
exchange market mainly via outright spot transactions by buying/selling Thai baht against US dollar, 
the currency most widely traded. Foreign exchange swap transactions are sometimes used in 
conjunction with outright intervention to influence liquidity conditions in the offshore market in order to 
make it more costly to fund speculative positions.  
Intervention has taken place in the spot market with both onshore and offshore counterparties when 
necessary to maintain stability in the market. We intervene via agent banks or by dealing directly with 
banks depending on whether it is deemed necessary to make our presence known in that particular 
intervention. In general, we intervene discreetly in order to retain an element of surprise as our 
confirmed presence in the market could exacerbate the pressures on the currency. However, in some 
cases, visibility is quite helpful in that it changes market dynamics in such a way that it deters some 
traders and speculators from entering the market.  
¾  Sterilisation 
Intervention and sterilisation are necessary policy tools under the inflation targeting framework with a 
managed-float exchange rate system. The bank is committed to the inflation targeting framework in 
which the 14-day repurchase rate is used as the operating target. Therefore, sterilisation is part of the 
appropriate management of liquidity in the money market.  
The bank conducts daily open market operations to equilibrate banks’ reserves supply and demand in 
order to maintain the policy rate. A daily liquidity forecast gives guidelines for the amount of 
injection/withdrawal needed, taking into accounts exogenous factors such as changes in currency in 
circulation and government expenditures and receipts, as well as the other operations of the bank, 
including foreign exchange operations. In general, a combination of monetary instruments, namely 
repos, BoT bond issuance and foreign exchange swaps is used for sterilising the foreign exchange 
intervention. 
We are aware of the cost/benefit that has arisen from sterilised intervention. In practice, however, this 
analysis is complicated by the fact that while the monetary costs to sterilisation (mostly in the form of 
foregone revenue and increased central bank balance sheet exposure) are possible to approximate, 
the benefits of less volatility in the exchange rates are not easily quantifiable. The BoT regularly 
estimates and monitors the monetary cost of sterilisation. However, the nature and extent of foreign 
exchange intervention are not greatly affected by it since the management of the exchange rate is first 
and foremost linked to reducing excessive volatility with the resulting benefits to the country’s 
international trade, as well as to external and internal economic stability. 
¾  Other foreign exchange measures 
To help safeguard against potential instability and speculative activities in the currency market, the 
Bank imposed a few measures on certain types of foreign exchange transactions as follows. 
•  29 January 1998: non-residents without any underlying trade or investment activities in 
Thailand were allowed to obtain Thai baht credit facilities from their onshore couterparties up 
to a combined outstanding amount of THB 50 million per entity. 
•  23 July 2003: to promote capital outflows, some exchange regulations were relaxed, eg 
allowing institutional investors to invest more abroad and allowing Thai residents to issue 
structured products which link returns to foreign variables such as foreign exchange rates 282  BIS Papers No 24
 
and foreign assets. As a result, demand for investment in foreign debt securities rose 
markedly. On 20  August 2003 the Bank approved the total investment of 
US$ 2,449.26 million. 
To deter short-term speculative capital inflows, the following two measures were imposed. 
•  11 September 2003: the amount of Thai baht that onshore financial institutions could borrow 
short-term (less than 3 months) from a non-resident without underlying trade or investment 
was limited to no more than THB 50 million per entity. However, transactions with underlying 
trade or investment were allowed without restrictions. This regulation resulted in baht-bullish 
non-residents shifting their investment from short-term Tom/Next swaps
4 into those of 
3-month and 6-month tenors. The daily average volume of Tom/Next transactions fell from 
US$  1,500  million to US$  120 million after the imposition of this measure. Nevertheless, 
some non-residents attempted to exploit the loopholes in the 11 September measure by 
parking their baht liquidity in Non-Resident Baht Accounts (NRBA) instead. As a 
consequence, the total outstanding of all NRBAs rocketed, reaching a peak of THB 63,000 
million in mid October 2003 from the normal level of around THB 18,000 million. 
•  14 October 2003: In light of findings that non-residents were using NRBAs to speculate on 
Thai baht instead of facilitating payments resulting from trades and investments in Thailand, 
the Bank issued a circular requesting onshore financial institutions to limit the outstanding 
balance of NRBAs at the close of the business day to no more than THB 300 million for each 
non-resident. This limit includes all NRBAs belonging to such a non-resident at all financial 
institutions in Thailand unless they have been exempted by the Bank of Thailand on a case 
by case basis. In addition, onshore financial institutions are prohibited from paying interest 
on current and saving NRBAs. The outstanding amount in the NRBAs was thus decreased 
substantially to around THB 16,000 million on the 16 October and has since stayed around 
THB 15,000-20,000 million. 
VI. Information  disclosure 
Data on foreign exchange reserves outstanding and forward obligations are published weekly in 
conformation with the SDDS reporting system. However, like some other central banks’ practice, data 
on foreign exchange market intervention are not published. One of our main reasons for not disclosing 
intervention data stems from the fact that our domestic foreign exchange market is still relatively small 
and not liquid or deep enough. Releasing intervention-related data at an inappropriate time could do 
more harm than good to the Thai economy, apart from the destabilising effect that could limit the 
effectiveness of the intervention. However, once the market becomes more developed in terms of its 
depth and breadth, it will allow the bank to be more transparent regarding this matter. 
                                                       
4  NRs have extensively used the foreign exchange swap market to manage their short-term baht liquidity. The Thai baht/US 
dollar swaps are quite active up to one-year maturity, but are more typically undertaken for a term of just one day through 
the so called “Tom/Next” (short for Tomorrow/Next) transaction. The first leg of the Tom/Next swap transaction takes place 
the day after the trade date where one would initially sell (buy) baht in exchange for US dollars. The second leg (the forward 
leg), where one would buy (sell) the baht back at the predetermined exchange rate, takes place the day after the first leg. 
Time line for Tom/Next swap transaction 
t   t+1   t+2 
 
trade date  first leg    second leg 